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PROBLEMS IN SECURITIZED CREDIT
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I
INTRODUCTION
Over the first half of the 1980s, the composition of new international credit
shifted from mainly syndicated bank loans to predominantly capital-markets
instruments—that is, securitized credit.1 As of the end of 2008, 84% of all credit
in the United States was provided via capital-markets instruments with only
16% provided via bank loans.2 Although a higher percentage of credit is
provided through bank lending in the Eurozone (44%) and in the United
Kingdom (46%), the share provided via credit-market instruments has been
rising in those regions as well.3 Over the past ten years, a substantial percentage
of that capital-markets-based financing has taken the form of private-label,
asset-backed securities. Global private-label securitization soared from almost
nothing in the late 1990s to peak at close to five trillion dollars in 2006.4 These
trends in the international securitization of credit have presented a number of
challenges for the prevention and containment of financial crises, and
accordingly for managing systemic risk.
One consequence of securitization is that the wide and increasingly
international sale and distribution of securities disperses credit ownership. This
distribution has a potential benefit of reducing the concentration of credit in
any single credit provider. But the dispersion also has the certain consequence
of spreading the effects of an adverse credit event widely when it occurs. The
wide dispersion of ownership across diverse investors with disparate interests
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1. See generally PAUL W. FEENEY, SECURITIZATION: REDEFINING THE BANK 9–28 (1995)
(discussing the trends in securitization of credit).
2. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, SECOND QUARTER 2009 (2009), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20090917/z1.pdf.
3. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: ENTERING A NEW ERA 22, 23
exhibit 20 (2009).
4. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 5, 84 fig.2.2 (2009)
[hereinafter GFSR].
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can also make it difficult to achieve the authorizations or agreements needed
for an orderly resolution of severely distressed debt.
If the potential negative effects of debt default on financial markets and the
real economy are substantial, this collective-action problem in resolving
distressed debt is not solely a concern of the affected debtors and creditors, but
it becomes a public-policy concern. Whenever an issuer of debt instruments is
subject to a statutory and judicial regime that provides a framework for
equitable restructuring of debt or an orderly liquidation in bankruptcy, the
potential for disorder and contagion are reduced. In the absence of such a legal
regime, contractual or other institutional arrangements may provide a
substitute framework for reorganization of debts.5
The collective-action problem in restructuring sovereign debt in the 1990s
and early 2000s was one aspect of securitization that made the sovereign debt
crises of those years more difficult to resolve than the comparable problems of
the 1980s. The collective-action problem appeared again as a hindrance to
containing the current subprime crisis. In both cases, the lack of an effective
framework for creditors and debtors to address severe financial distress caused
by significant levels of debt had negative implications for the international
economy. The financial and legal structures of securitized credit failed to
anticipate the potential for such severe distress and, when it occurred, there was
no clear path to resolve it. Thus, in both the sovereign debt and subprime crises,
containing the risk caused by a major credit event became more difficult and
called for significant public resources to mitigate the adverse effects.
Since the onset of the current financial crisis, much has been written about
what needs to be done to prevent similar catastrophes in the future. Preventing
and containing systemic risks in the international financial system will require a
host of reforms in terms of macroeconomic and financial policies, financialsystem structure and regulation, and institutional governance and performance
in both the public and private sectors.6 One lesson from the sovereign debt
crises of the past, however, is that credit mechanisms lacking a framework for

5. For a discussion of these arrangements, see for example, Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 576.
6. See, e.g., FIN. SERV. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf
[hereinafter TURNER REVIEW]; GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR
FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf; INT’L
MONETARY FUND, THE RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL—INITIAL ASSESSMENT, POLICY LESSONS,
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE (2008), available at http://imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/
2008/040908.pdf; Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of
Governors of the International Monetary Fund (October 11, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/cm/2008/101108a.htm; Declaration [of the G-20] Summit on Financial Markets and the
World Economy (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_
declaration.pdf; Summit Communiqué of the G-20: The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (Apr. 2,
2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Treasury,
Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg72.htm.
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orderly resolution of severely distressed debt are an invitation to financial crisis.
Because securitized credit is likely to remain an important segment of
international finance, and because securitizations inevitably make collective
action more complex,7 both market participants and systemic-risk overseers
need to proactively assure that the mechanisms are in place to resolve
distressed debt even in extreme events.
II
HOW SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES WERE RESOLVED IN THE ERA OF
SYNDICATED BANK LOANS
It is useful to consider how the framework for resolving international
financial crises functioned in the 1980s, when most credit was provided through
commercial bank loans. Although the challenges for crisis management seemed
Herculean at the time, neither the added complexities of large volumes of
sovereign debt evidenced by capital-markets instruments (which occurred in the
1990s), nor a financial market driven by advanced financial engineering (as we
have today), were yet factors in managing systemic risk.
A number of economic, financial, and political factors resulted in the
buildup of high levels of external debt by a number of developing countries in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Much of the debt was U.S. dollar–denominated,
and the interest payments had floating rates linked to the London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR). Once the United States and a number of other
industrial countries adopted substantially tighter monetary policies to control
inflation in the early 1980s (affecting interest rates and exchange rates), the
debt burdens of these countries became unsustainable. First Mexico in 1982,8
then Brazil, Argentina, Chile, the Philippines, and a number of other countries
in Latin America and Eastern Europe were effectively unable to meet their
foreign debts when contractually due.9
The majority of that debt took the form of commercial bank loans that were
generally syndicated by the internationally active money-center banks to a
broader segment of the banking community in the United States and abroad.
The original sources of these funds were the balance-of-payments surpluses of
the oil-exporting states. The international banking system “recycled” the

7. See GFSR, supra note 4, at 2–3.
8. Poland defaulted on approximately eight billion dollars in external debt in March 1981, but the
size and scope of the global crisis attracted heightened government concern when Mexico’s difficulties
became known. LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC
MACHINERY 102, 156 (2003).
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE
1–19 (1984) (describing the origins of the 1980s debt crisis and its resolution); PAUL A. VOLCKER &
TOYOO GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE WORLD'S MONEY AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN
LEADERSHIP 187–227 (1992) (same).
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petrodollars, and the oil-exporting countries thereby indirectly financed much
of the debt arising from the higher oil-import bills of developing countries.10
The potential defaults on the very sizeable obligations of the debtor
countries posed risks to the international financial system as a whole in two
ways. First, in many cases, the loans made by the major money-center banks to
sovereign borrowers dwarfed the capital available to those banks for reserves or
write-offs of the troubled debts. Thus, if defaults on the debt owed to these
banks occurred, an “old fashioned” banking crisis was a possibility. Second, if
all of the insolvent debtor countries had to make the economic adjustments
necessary to quickly generate the resources needed to meet all outstanding
debt, such an abrupt retrenchment could severely harm not only their domestic
economies, but all the economies to which they were linked globally. Thus, the
imminent default, first by Mexico and then by many others, was a public-policy
concern that required concerted action to prevent these negative consequences
for the financial system and the global economy.11
With the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
United States, the public sector and the international banking community
worked to develop a process for an orderly resolution of the crisis—in
particular, a mechanism to give banks the time to boost their earnings and their
capital to absorb the risks on their books, and the debtors the time to take the
economic-adjustment measures needed to restore external viability. In most
cases the IMF had a critical role in assessing the credibility of the debtor’s
economic-adjustment program and determining what level of adjustment or
belt-tightening was achievable. The IMF program essentially established how
much external financing would be needed during the adjustment period. The
IMF had some resources to help meet those needs and some other officialsector funds might have been forthcoming, but the sizes of the “financing gaps”
for these debtors could not be met by government assistance alone. Moreover,
the public sector was not disposed as a policy matter to “bailing out” the
imprudent decisions of the marketplace. Essentially, the IMF program defined
the size of the contribution that the commercial-bank lenders were expected to
make—thus the term “bail-out” was properly replaced with the term “bail-in.”12
The large money-center banks—with substantial loans to sovereigns
potentially in default, and with their reputations as major syndicate leaders
further at stake—were motivated to work with the public sector within the
foregoing framework to resolve the crisis. As the “agent banks” in the
syndicated credits, they had responsibilities to collect and distribute payments
on the loans for the hundreds of other banks in their syndicates and to convey
important information to the other banks. But they had authority neither to
amend key financial terms in the loans on their own nor to obtain net new

10. VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 187–227.
11. CLINE, supra note 9, at 21–29; RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 155–56.
12. CLINE, supra note 9, at 29–32; VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 200–07.
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financing from banks in the syndicate. Thus, even in the simplified world of
commercial-bank loans as the main channel of credit, there were collectiveaction challenges to resolving distressed debt.13
The banks were experienced in addressing distressed corporate credits,
though, and they used that model to organize creditor committees vis-à-vis each
debtor country, both as a point of contact and discussion with the debtor and as
a channel of communication with other creditors. The committees and their
chairmen also became important points of contact with the IMF and other
public-sector collaborators in the resolution of the crisis. One of the most
difficult hurdles was to persuade all the banks in the syndicates to put in their
proportional share of new money commitments. To facilitate the process, the
public sector used a number of carrots—such as regulatory forbearance on the
reserving rules on those loans—and sticks—such as IMF threats not to disburse
its own funds without a critical mass of committed private-sector financing.
Over time, as serial restructuring of each country’s debt began to wear down the
patience of all the participants, multi-year restructurings took their place. Over
a seven-year period, more of the bank lenders had a chance to rebuild earnings
and capital, and several were actively looking for a way to transform their bank
loans into more-liquid assets. Many were anxious to spend fewer resources and
less time on the crisis in less-developed countries and to focus on other
business.14
In 1989, the Brady Plan was launched by the U.S. Treasury. Under that plan,
bank loans were converted to marketable, collateralized bonds. Those
exchanges resulted in the banks’ writing off a portion of the debt principal or
reducing interest payments, and improving the banks’ credit risk through
collateral arrangements. By this time, Citibank had unilaterally declared a
write-down of another twenty percent of the face value of the sovereign debt on
its books, and a number of other banks followed, giving them considerable
flexibility in future restructurings. Thus began a period of debt forgiveness and
the “securitization” of sovereign debt. As more restructurings created even
more-varied and interesting securities in the “exchange offers” for outstanding
loans, an active trading business in all of the debt instruments flourished. Over
time, new groups of investors (for example, mutual funds, pension funds, and
insurance companies) in emerging-markets debt developed as the debtor
countries’ economic and financial strength grew and the potential returns
appeared more attractive. The debtors thus began obtaining substantial

13. See 1 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS ch. 7 (Robert C. Effros ed.
1992).
14. See Andrew Yianni, Proposed New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, XII CENTRAL
BANKING 3, 84–86 (2002); see also RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 95–131, 162–68 (discussing the Bank
Advisory Committee process for restructuring sovereign debt owed to commercial banks); VOLCKER &
GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 207–19 (discussing the aftermath of the Latin American crisis).
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amounts of new financing through international bond issues as a routine part of
their public finance.15
The crisis resolution framework of the 1980s shared a number of key
elements:
1. Although the bank loans were widely syndicated, making
restructuring of the distressed debt more complex, all the lenders were
commercial banks. Most had suffered similar regulatory and
accounting consequences from defaults or restructuring decisions, all
had experience with and accepted the concept of debt work-outs, and
all held claims of equal rank or priority. Thus, reaching agreement on
the terms of a restructuring was aided by the creditors’ essentially
similar interests.
2. In lieu of a bankruptcy regime for assuring an independent
assessment of the fairness of restructuring the debtor’s and the
creditors’ interests, an IMF program gave some assurance to the
creditors that the debtor was engaged in good-faith economic reforms
and that a third party monitored ongoing progress on those reforms to
provide some confidence that the restructured loans would be repaid
when due.
3. The syndicated loans themselves had provisions to ease agreement
on the restructuring terms and to discourage free riders. A key
provision was that any recoveries by any individual creditor had to be
shared among all creditors pari passu (facilitating collaborative
actions). Moreover, to discourage debtors from catering to hold-outs,
the agreement included mandatory prepayment provisions, which
provided that if a bank eligible to participate in a restructuring
agreement did not do so and obtained better terms, the banks that had
agreed to the restructuring agreement could generally insist on the
same terms as the hold-out bank. Although some hold-outs appeared
in reschedulings, these tended to be sufficiently minor, so that the
16
deals got done and life moved on.
4. The public and private sectors cooperated to resolve the crisis in
the context of an equitable framework—the debtor countries had to
undertake significant economic adjustments, the creditors had to
provide significant net financing to allow an orderly adjustment
period, and the broader international community provided some
bridge financing, some regulatory forbearance, and the institutional
imprimatur of the IMF to give the process credibility.

15. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 168–77; VOLCKER & GYOHTEN, supra note 9, at 207–19.
16. At a late stage in the Brady bond restructurings, some agreements also included provisions by
which key financial terms could be amended by specified majority votes (albeit a 75–85% majority),
thereby allowing for a “cramdown” of the restructuring terms on nonconsenting minority creditors.
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Thus, in the era of syndicated commercial-bank credit, a framework existed
for working out distressed sovereign debt in an orderly way without
jeopardizing the financial system as a whole and leaving the public sector with
the enormous financial consequences of such an event.
III
THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM IN SECURITIZED SOVEREIGN DEBT
Mexico’s debt crisis of 1994 and how it was resolved demonstrate stark
differences with the preceding era. In contrast with the 1980s, by 1994, credit
was obtained by sovereigns in much larger amounts through the capital markets
than through traditional bank loans, and the levels of that debt grew as
emerging-market economies grew. As countries increasingly saw the benefits of
this financing, global capital markets became much more open and unregulated.
The bondholders of emerging-market debt in the 1990s included financial
institutions (holding the debt in both trading and investment accounts), other
institutional investors (such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance
companies looking for diversification and higher yields), expatriates, and retail
investors (typically in those countries without customer “suitability”
requirements in their regulation of brokers and investment advisors, or where
such requirements had not been observed). Investors were not only
geographically diverse, but given the nature of their various institutions, their
motivations and the time horizons were vastly so, as were differences in the
regulatory and accounting rules affecting their holdings and potential
restructuring of the bonds they owned. Moreover, many of the investors held
their investments through third parties, so determining the identity of the
beneficial owners could be difficult.17
When Mexico’s political turmoil and financial difficulties led to a potential
default on fifteen billion dollars of short-term, external government bonds in
the spring of 1994, the U.S. Treasury became concerned about the shock this
default could cause to the financial system and its potential spill-over effects on
other countries. The shock would come partly from the 1980s practice of
excluding bond indebtedness from sovereign debt restructurings. Such exclusion
was possible when bonds were a small portion of a country’s overall
indebtedness. There were difficulties as well in applying the restructuring
paradigm of the 1980s to the 1994 crisis: there were no creditor committees of
bondholders to organize a standstill and negotiate a restructuring agreement;
the terms of the Mexican bond contracts (governed by New York law) had no
“majority action” provisions, so every bondholder had the legal right to
accelerate debt in default and sue to recover; and the variety of locations and

17. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 190–93; GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN
LIQUIDITY CRISES ¶¶ 10–15 (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.pdf?noframes=1
[hereinafter Rey Report].
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interests of the various classes of bondholders made reaching a relatively quick
and orderly resolution exceedingly difficult.18
In these circumstances, the United States led the international official
community in supporting a fifty-billion-dollar rescue package to staunch capital
outflows from Mexico, with the effect of bailing out Mexico’s bondholders (as
well as financing other such “capital flight”). Notwithstanding the international
community’s aim of preventing contagion to other countries, the crisis shattered
investor confidence in other emerging-market borrowers and caused severe
restrictions on capital-markets access for Argentina, Brazil, and others.19
Although the international community collaborated to provide this massive
public-sector support to Mexico in 1994, the moral hazard its action posed to
maintaining financial discipline in debtor countries and among international
investors led to extensive discussion on how to improve the sovereign debt
crisis-prevention and crisis-resolution framework. Moreover, the magnitude of
international capital flows to emerging-markets countries dwarfed the available
amounts of public-sector resources, making public bailouts of all countries that
might face capital flight increasingly difficult as a practical matter, even if this
had been viewed as acceptable as a policy matter. After the Asian debt crisis
and the Russian default in the late 1990s, the pressure for substantial reform
became even greater. Russia’s financial crisis in 1998 was the clearest example
of moral hazard in action. For a number of years in the lead-up to the crisis, the
IMF and the international public sector supported Russia with a series of IMF
programs on which Russia failed to perform. When the IMF finally pulled the
plug and stopped lending in 1998, Russia defaulted on its massive debt to the
private sector. Its investors had continued to provide financing, notwithstanding
plenty of solid information on Russia’s dire financial condition, in the belief that
Russia was “too nuclear to fail”—that is, the investors assumed that they would
in the end be bailed out as Mexico was in 1994. The shock of Russia’s default
caused a true international financial crisis, with a massive flight of investors to
the safety and quality of U.S. Treasury securities and little else.20
From 1996 through 2000 a flurry of public- and private-sector proposals
were made (and a number of concrete actions in fact taken) to strengthen the
architecture for sovereign debt crisis prevention and resolution.21 Most had
these elements in common:

18. PETER B. KENEN, THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: WHAT’S NEW?
WHAT’S MISSING? 19–26 (2001); RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 198–202; Rey Report, supra note 17, at ¶¶
36–45, 53–65.
19. By 1995, Mexico did adopt a strong economic-adjustment program and moved to a more
flexible, essentially floating exchange rate, repaid its debt to the IMF and bilateral official creditors,
restored a sustainable balance of payments position, and attained renewed access to international
capital markets. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 198–202.
20. See, e.g., KENEN, supra note 18, at 26–47; RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 203–11.
21. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, REVIEWING THE PROCESS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK (2003), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.pdf.
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1. A recognition that crisis resolution is far more complex when a
wide variety of institutional and individual investors hold sovereign
debt;
2. An acceptance, therefore, that crisis prevention was even more
important than in the past, and this required a number of
improvements in economic- and debt-sustainability surveillance by the
IMF, financial-system regulation and supervision, data gathering and
disclosure by debtors to their investors, and “self-insurance” by the
debtor countries;
3. A recognition that bondholders could not expect to be “senior” or
their holdings classified as “excluded” debt when a sovereign’s debt
load became unsustainable and needed to be restructured (this point
was emphasized by the 1999 restructuring of the bonds issued by
Pakistan); and
4. A recognition that a framework was needed to make an orderly
restructuring of sovereign-bond indebtedness less complex
(notwithstanding the restructuring of sovereign bonds in a number of
sovereign-bond exchanges that occurred over this period in
conjunction with large IMF programs of support).
In this regard, the Group of Ten’s 1996 Rey Report22 first recommended that
sovereign bonds include the same types of collective-action clauses that were
standard in English-law-governed Eurobonds, including those issued by
sovereigns.23 These clauses would allow for majority action to restructure
financial terms and to accelerate the debt repayment only by a decision of the
majority, not by individual creditors; the clauses would also require pro rata
sharing of any recoveries made by individual creditors should they take action
by litigation, set-off, or otherwise. Such modifications should facilitate orderly
restructurings. In contrast to English-law-governed bonds, New York–lawgoverned sovereign bonds had been patterned on the forms used for corporate
bonds issued in accordance with the Trust Indenture Act.24 That Act gave
extensive protections to individual bondholders, including protections for
minority bondholders.25

22. Rey Report, supra note 17, at 46–47.
23. For a discussion of the collective-action clauses in English-law-governed Eurobonds and a
comparison with New York–law-governed bonds, see Andrew Yianni, Resolution of Sovereign
Financial Crises—Evolution of the Private Sector Restructuring Process, FIN. STABILITY REV., June
1999, at 80–81.
24. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1627, 1683–84 (2006); Rey Report, supra note 17, at 45–46.
25. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1683–84. In the corporate bond context, these
protections were not inappropriate, as U.S. bankruptcy-code provisions assured equitable treatment of
debtors and various classes of creditors in a corporate reorganization.
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It was not until the Argentine financial crisis in 2001—and a series of failed
IMF-approved economic programs—that the public sector became more
assertive about the need to improve the framework for sovereign debt
restructurings.26 In addition to the Argentine crisis, a series of large IMF
programs and support packages—for Brazil and Turkey, in particular—had
signaled the need for a system under which the private sector made a greater
contribution to crisis avoidance and resolution.27
In the fall of 2001, two key alternative proposals for improving the sovereign
debt-restructuring framework were put forward: the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) and the adoption of Collective-Action
Clauses (CACs) in sovereign bonds. The SDRM—first proposed by First
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, Anne Krueger—would give the IMF a
more intrusive role in the debt-restructuring process and, most importantly,
would allow the IMF to “sanction” a standstill in the payment of sovereign debt
when necessary to facilitate an orderly restructuring. The investor community
was vehemently opposed to this plan, especially due to this potential suspension
of their basic contract rights. The issuers, for their part, were concerned that the
plan would increase their costs of financing and indeed might scare off the
capital markets to a large extent.28
The alternative, market-based solution proposed by the Under Secretary of
the Treasury, John Taylor, was for the market participants to include CACs
(along the lines proposed in 1996 in the Rey Report) in all future sovereign
bond offerings.29 Thus, bondholders would effectively recognize that their claims
were not exempt from restructuring and that they had a responsibility to work
with the debtor in distress for an orderly resolution of debt problems. For their
part, issuers would recognize that they had a responsibility to work with their
creditors in advance of extreme distress and that the international official
community should not be the presumed savior. There was a continued
recognition of the role of IMF programs and of reasonable, finite amounts of
official resources in support of such a restructuring.
26. RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 251–56. Argentina’s crisis led to a massive default in early 2002 on
forty-seven billion dollars of external debt as well as default on its domestic debts. It is not clear that
any improved restructuring framework would have made Argentine debt resolution orderly in view of
the country’s complex and difficult politics, its soured relations with the IMF at that time, its diversity in
geography and type of bondholders holding the debt, and the sheer extent of economic adjustment
required. Argentina’s political, economic, and financial problems had become extreme due to its failure
to confront at an earlier date the intractable external imbalances produced by a fixed exchange-rate
regime. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 70–97 (2007).
27. NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 61–63, 65–66 (2004).
28. See generally RIEFFEL, supra note 8, at 250–53, 266–71 (discussing Krueger’s role upon arriving
at the IMF and the features of the SDRM); Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631.
29. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 111–18; John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Institute for International
Economics Conference: Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards? (Apr. 2, 2002), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm.
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The active and serious discussion at the IMF of the SDRM no doubt had a
motivating role in getting investors and issuers to increasingly consider the use
of CACs. Yet the discussions ended up in a complete standoff between the
issuers and investors in September 2002, for many reasons: The investors were a
diverse group, including “vulture” funds whose modus operandi was to buy
distressed sovereign debt at a deep discount and to sue for recovery of the face
value once restructuring talks were imminent or underway (and who therefore
strongly opposed creditor contract provisions under which a majority could
determine the fate of all those holding relevant instruments), more-traditional
distressed-debt investors, emerging-market-debt traders, and a wide range of
institutional investors. Each class of investors had unique financial interests
dependent on its motivations for investment, other business interests in the
emerging markets, and accounting and regulatory regimes. So each class sought
different tradeoffs for any documentation concession to issuers. The sovereign
issuers, for their part, objected to many of the investor tradeoffs, and by
requesting the adoption of CACs, they did not want to imply that they had any
intention to default on their debt in the future. Moreover, they were concerned
about the effect of such clauses on their cost of borrowing.30
After the standoff, in the interests of the international financial system as a
whole, the U.S. Treasury in particular became much more active in cajoling
issuers to take the leap individually or collectively to issue their new
international bonds with CACs. It was not until February 2003 (over seven
years after the Rey Report recommendations) that Mexico courageously led the
way with an SEC-registered global note containing CACs. By moving first, it
took the risk of increased funding costs, but it also gained the advantage of
setting the terms of the new clauses. As it happened, the market did not impose
any cost for the documentation changes on Mexico or on any of the other
sovereign issuers who followed. The other benefit of Mexico’s action was that
the SDRM was pulled off the IMF’s work agenda, and the constant talk of
potential sovereign defaults—which might chill market access—was put to an
end.31
At about the same time, Uruguay (which had suffered contagion from
Argentina’s 2001 debt default) had successfully negotiated a restructuring of its
debt in the context of an IMF program and thus had avoided default. As in the
1980s, the IMF program affirmed the acceptable parameters of Uruguay’s
economic adjustment, thereby defining the financing gap that needed to be
filled during the adjustment period, and Uruguay worked with the public and
private sectors to fill the gap. Uruguay completed its 2003 debt-exchange offer,
which was sufficient to meet the private-sector contribution to the needed
financing. Moreover, the debt exchange was adopted at a very high acceptance

30. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 127–30; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631.
31. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 127–30; Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 24, at 1631.
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rate by investors and included in the new bond offerings CACs with no cost to
the issuer.32
Thus was established the framework for crisis resolution for sovereign debt,
including sovereign bonds. Although this framework does not assure that
sovereign debt crises will be avoided or that contagion from one country to
others will not occur, it at least provides a path for avoiding default and for
avoiding a chaotic resolution of distressed debt in the future.
This experience with the securitization of sovereign debt offers several
lessons:
1. Securitization created a great diversity and variety in the interests
of the sovereign’s creditors, making resolution of a financial crisis
more difficult and complex;
2. This necessitated far greater attention to crisis prevention on the
part of the sovereign borrowers as well as the international
community;
3. For these capital-markets activities to continue without
jeopardizing the stability of the international financial system as a
whole, there needed to be a framework acceptable to the relevant
market participants for addressing distressed debt in a reasonably
orderly way even in cases of extreme distress; and
4. Creating a stronger crisis-prevention and resolution framework
required the active collaboration of the private and public sectors.
Moreover, there was a clear need for the public sector to drive
reforms: the differing interests of diverse market participants, each of
whom would be motivated primarily by private advantage and not the
public good, were unlikely to produce the results required for the
safety of the financial system as a whole.
These lessons needed to be applied more broadly as the international
financial system grew more complex in the years that followed.
IV
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEM
Securitization of credit has reached new dimensions of complexity in the
current decade. In the 1990s, we were coping with the mere conversion of bank
loans to sovereign bonds sold in international capital markets. This created far
less-difficult risk-management challenges than the securitization of credit
through advanced financial engineering, which characterizes the financial

32. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 21, at 33–34.
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markets today. These challenges are well illustrated in the private-label33
residential-mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market.
The U.S. subprime residential mortgages, at the heart of the current global
financial crisis, were pooled into special purpose vehicles or trusts, against
which securities were issued and sold to diverse investors around the world. The
securities were often “tranched” to create different priorities for different
classes of investors respecting the trust assets, increasing the complexity of these
securitizations. In some cases, securities were enhanced by third-party
guarantors or swap providers—who themselves had a specified priority of claim
on the trust. Further complexity could be added by pooling the trust securities
themselves into another trust, usually with the effect of increasing the leverage
in the structure and diversity of investor interests. If the trusts—which typically
held assets with long maturities—were funded in part by short-term borrowing,
as was often the case, substantial liquidity risk was added to credit risk in the
structures.34
The transfer of credit risk on the residential mortgages from the originators
(generally banks or specialized mortgage lenders) to a wide range of other
investors was thought to make the financial system safer—that is, the transfer
should result in less risk concentration and therefore a greater capacity of the
market to absorb the credit risk on the assets. In fact, the complexity,
opaqueness, and the financial and legal structure of this credit mechanism
caused serious credit deterioration in a fairly narrow segment of world financial
markets (the U.S. subprime residential-mortgage market) to become the source
of a major financial panic and global recession.35
At the heart of the subprime crisis was a seriously flawed, sometimes
fraudulent, underwriting process that created high-risk residential-mortgage
loans that were repackaged, sold, and often repackaged again, into securities
carrying investment-grade bond ratings. The structure and pricing of the
securitizations and their credit ratings were premised on flawed risk models,
often using historical loss ratios on prime mortgages. The mortgages themselves
were overly leveraged, as were the trusts against which the securities were
issued and the third-party guarantors that enhanced these structures. The risks
in these products were inadequately disclosed; diligence by investors,
guarantors, and ratings agencies was inadequate; and, when the bubble burst,
information was lacking as to where these widely sold and potentially toxic
assets resided throughout the international financial system. When the U.S.
residential-real-estate bubble burst and the credit ratings on the RMBS were

33. These are the residential-mortgage-backed securities created by sponsors other than
government-sponsored entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
34. PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY STATEMENT ON
FINANCIAL MARKETS DEVELOPMENTS 1–9 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf [hereinafter PWG 2008]; Randall Dodd, Subprime:
Tentacles of a Crisis, IMF FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2007, at 15–19.
35. GFSR, supra note 4.

JACKLIN

188

11/6/2010

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:175

lowered, fear about the size, scope, and distribution of the potential credit
losses led to a financial panic characterized by heavy asset liquidations and a
global flight to quality. Thus, the credit excesses in the U.S. subprime
residential-mortgage market became magnified and distributed globally by
virtue of the securitization process used.36
The legal and financial structure of the RMBS made the crisis exceedingly
difficult to resolve. First, the complexity and opaqueness of the securitization
structures made it very hard to ascertain the fair value of these assets and thus
determine the true financial condition of the financial institutions carrying them
on their books. Thus, determining how best to deal with the impact of the crisis
on the financial sector and credit markets was likewise extremely difficult.37
Second, addressing the underlying problem of bad mortgage loans and the
risks to the economy of widespread foreclosures was more difficult, still. The
collective-action problem for orderly resolution of the distressed debt in the
RMBS trusts was far more complex than that confronted in the sovereign-bond
restructurings of the 1990s. Like the sovereign debt of the 1990s, RMBS were
not subject to a bankruptcy or other established regime that would create a
framework for a reorganization of the underlying debt. The RMBS were
intentionally structured so that the trusts were “bankruptcy remote,” and the
underlying mortgage loans in the trusts also had certain protections from
modification in bankruptcy. Thus, it was the contract terms of the RMBS that
determined the structure for dealing with distressed debt in the trusts.38
The collective-action problem in resolving distressed debt in the trusts was
not one of merely organizing highly diverse and dispersed investors (much like
the problem in the sovereign bonds of the 1990s), but of dealing with investors
with different priorities of claims against the trust issuer. In addition, the
distressed assets were themselves claims on a multitude of debtors and involved
diverse collateral in the form of individual home mortgages. So a collective-

36. PWG 2008, supra note 34; INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE RECENT TURMOIL—INITIAL
ASSESSMENT, POLICY LESSONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUND SURVEILLANCE 1–10, (2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/040908.pdf; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 6, at
11–28.
37. It was much harder to stabilize the financial system following the current crisis than it was
following the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s, when banks and regulators could fairly quickly
determine the risk exposures of individual banks and the amount of capital needed to rebuild their
balance sheets. In contrast, in 2008 and 2009, the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration,
as well as governments of foreign countries whose financial systems were adversely affected, struggled
to determine which institutions had large risk exposures, how to measure potential losses, and whether
capital infusions or government programs to purchase “toxic assets” or government guarantees of bank
debt could best address the risks to the global financial system. Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS
Quarterly Review, Dec. 2008, at 10–11, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812.pdf; Henry
M. Paulson, Jr., U.S. Treasury Sec’y, Remarks at The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (Nov. 20,
2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1285.htm; U.S. Treasury Department, Fact
Sheet: Financial Stability Plan, Feb. 9, 2009, available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/factsheet.pdf.
38. Anne Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1117 (2009).
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action problem affected not only the diversity of the investors but also the
diversity of the debtors and the collateral supporting the debts.
The contracts that governed the RMBS reflected the practical reality that
individual investors needed to delegate to an agent the ability to deal with
assets in the trust that were in default or that might potentially default.39 The
servicer of the loans, who collected and disbursed payments to the trust and
investors, was typically delegated that responsibility in the Master Pooling and
Servicing Agreement (MPSA). The terms of the RMBS, including the MPSA,
were designed to maximize investor interest in acquiring the securities,
including obtaining the highest credit ratings possible. Moreover, unlike the
debtors of sovereign bonds, the ultimate “debtors” of the assets in the trust
(that is, the homeowners with mortgages in the trusts) had no voice in designing
what procedures would be applied should their ability to repay or refinance
their obligations become seriously impaired. For both these reasons, the terms
of the MPSA were clearly investor friendly.40 Further, in an economic
environment in which housing prices seemed ever on the rise, the sponsors of
the securitizations and the credit-rating agencies that facilitated the growth of
the business adopted a financial and legal framework for the RMBS that
assumed default rates based on historical averages in the U.S. residentialmortgage markets (which had been dominated by prime lending, not the morerecent subprime standards).41 And they surely did not contemplate or provide
for the contingency of widespread defaults, market contagion, and a severe
economic downturn.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the MPSAs had a number of features that
made orderly workouts of distressed residential mortgages held by the trusts
particularly difficult. Some contracts severely limited the scope of the servicer’s
rights to make material modifications in the mortgage-loan terms, particularly
in advance of an actual default. Others may have granted broad discretion, but
in doing so failed to establish a clear standard for servicer conduct. In both
cases, the servicer was concerned about liability and thus was reluctant to act
(particularly when there were competing creditor priorities, such that any action
would likely favor one class of creditor over another). Indeed, there were no
established industry or contractual standards by which the performance of
servicers dealing with distressed debt in RMBS trusts would be judged; yet the
trustees on behalf of bondholders had the authority to replace the servicers.
The manner in which the servicer was compensated also affected the actions it

39. A default by a mortgagor on an asset held by the trust does not trigger a default on the RMBS.
Rather, the rights of the investor vis-à-vis the servicer, and the rights and duties of the servicer when
such a default occurs are set out in the contract terms.
40. Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 38, at 1124; Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of Mortgage
Servicers: Myths and Realities 3 (Federal Reserve Board Finance and Economics Discussion Series,
Staff Working Paper No. 46, 2008); John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually
Say About Loan Modification?, BERKELEY LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. CTR. FOR LAW, BUS., AND THE
ECON. 1 (2009).
41. PWG 2008, supra note 34, at 14; INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 36, at 6–7.
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was willing to take: reimbursement for out-of-pocket foreclosure expenses was
often more easily collected than the administrative costs of negotiating a
workout. And because the sponsors of and investors in securitizations did not
contemplate the potential for extreme debt distress, many servicers lacked the
personnel and resources, no less the expertise, to handle potential workouts on
the scale that materialized in this crisis.42
Some of the foregoing obstacles to mortgage workouts were addressed at
least in part by the U.S. government and by the mortgage industry. Congress
authorized government payments to compensate servicers for some of the
added costs of workouts. And the mortgage industry agreed on standards for
acceptable workout options to facilitate quicker responses and to mitigate
servicer-liability risk.43 Nonetheless, problems persisted in addressing the
distressed debt and in preventing foreclosures.
The longer the delay in resolving the distressed-mortgage debt, the higher
the rate of home foreclosures, and the greater the downward pressure on home
prices. This in turn exacerbated the financial-industry distress and economicfeedback effects on the economy, thereby deepening the crisis.44 Part of the
problem in preventing foreclosures as the crisis played out was that the
persistent decline in home prices and increasing unemployment made many
debtors likely to be either unwilling or unable to service restructured loans,
even with substantial financial concessions. In both cases, the option of
foreclosure would likely appear preferable to servicers and investors.45
The subprime crisis reinforces the lessons from the sovereign debt crises of
the 1980s and 1990s regarding the costs of the collective-action problem posed
by securitized credit: First, securitization creates a diversity of investors (and in
the case of pooled assets, a diversity of debtors as well), making more complex
and difficult the resolution of distressed debt; and the more complex and
opaque the structures and diverse the investor interests, the greater these
difficulties are. Second, crisis-prevention measures are therefore all the more
important. For example, credit standards need to be robust and observed; risk
42. Cordell et al., supra note 40, at 6; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 38, at 1126.
43. For guidelines developed for handling currently distressed mortgages and government
programs for payments to servicers and other incentives for restructuring distressed mortgage debt, see,
for example, Hope Now Alliance 2008, http://www.hopenow.com; Press Briefing with Treasury
Secretary Geithner, HUD Secretary Donovan, and FDIC Chairman Bair (Feb. 18, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Briefing-with-Treasury-Secretary-Geithner-HUDSecretary-Donovan-and-FDIC-Cha/.
44. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Relief for Responsible Home Owners (Mar. 4,
2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg48.htm.
45. For an analysis of lender and servicer behavior in renegotiating distressed mortgage debt, see
Renae Merle, Foreclosures are Often in Lenders’ Best Interest, WASH. POST, July 28, 2009, at A1;
Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home
Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy
Discussion Papers No. 09-4, 2009), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/
ppdp0904.pdf. For a discussion of the ways in which the U.S. laws governing personal bankruptcy may
affect debtor and creditor motivations for voluntary work-outs of residential mortgage debt, see
Levitin, supra note 5.
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must not be disguised through overly complex and opaque instruments; risk
needs to be properly compensated; leverage must not be excessive; risk models
should not be based on flawed historical data and should incorporate the
potential of extreme risk events; and market, liquidity, and credit risks all must
be soundly assessed.46 Third, credit mechanisms must provide a framework for
resolving distressed debt in an orderly way. No matter how intelligently risk
appears to be managed, credit and market risks can cause unanticipated
defaults. A framework that is not adequate to address a situation of extreme
distress is an invitation to financial crisis. And fourth, the public-sector
overseers of systemic risk47 need to be proactive in assuring that the crisisprevention and crisis-resolution frameworks are in place for credit provided
through traditional banking channels, through the capital markets, or by other
mechanisms of financial intermediation. As we learned with the sovereign debt
of the 1990s and with the RMBS instruments of today, it is incorrect to assume
that market participants, in pursuit of their diverse private interests, will take
the actions needed to adequately address risks to the system as a whole.48

46. See GFSR, supra note 4. In the United States, federal legislation and regulations have been
proposed or adopted to address many of these risks in the structure of mortgage–backed securities and
other asset–backed securities. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 229, 230, 232,
239, 240, 243 and 249, Asset Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117, Exchange Act Release
No. 61,858 (proposed Apr. 7, 2010); Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Treatment
by the FDIC as Conservator or Receiver of Financial Assets Transferred by an Insured Depository
Institution in Connection with a Securitization or Participation, May 11, 2010 [hereinafter FDIC
Proposal]. In addition, the industry participants in these markets have proposed changes to industry
practices in the comprehensive Project Restart; see generally http://www.americansecuritization.com/
restart; see also GFSR, supra note 4 (critiquing actions by the private and public sector to strengthen
the architecture of the RMBS market). These are important steps in crisis prevention affecting the
securitized credit that was at the heart of the current financial crisis.
47. See Summit Communiqué of the G-20, supra note 6 (setting forth the new role of the Financial
Stability Board); Press Release, Treasury Outlines Framework for Regulatory Reform, supra note 6
(focusing on management of systemic risk by a designated systemic risk regulator for the U.S.).
48. The public sector is just beginning to address issues related to resolution of distressed
securitized debt and debt created through the burgeoning global derivatives markets. The FDIC
Proposal seeks to address the contractual provisions affecting the restructuring of distressed assets
contained in securitized pools. FDIC Proposal, supra note 46. However, these rules would only apply
where insured banks are the transferors of the assets. The Dodd-Frank Act contains provisions to
reduce systemic risk from arising from the settlement of distressed derivatives contracts by requiring
increased use of central clearinghouses and exchanges. Dodd-Frank, supra note 46. Also, CFTC
Chairman Gary Gensler has drawn attention to the way in which credit derivatives may impede the
resolution of distressed debt in corporate bankruptcy. Gary Gensler, OTC Derivatives Reform,
Keynote Address at Market’s Outlook for OTC Derivatives Conference (Mar. 9, 2010). All of these
legislative and regulatory initiatives are important steps in making U.S. financial markets and
international financial markets less susceptible to systemic risk.

